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Corporate, Social, and Political Networks of Koch Industries Inc. and TD 
Ameritrade Holding Corporation: Extension to the State of Nebraska 
Abstract:  The importance of interlocking board directorships among corporations and between 
corporations and social organizations has been confirmed for defining the modern political 
economy. This paper finds the networks of those interlocks for Koch Industries Inc. and TD 
Ameritrade Holding Corporation and extends the networks to describe and analyze the 
accompanying political network of contributions to Nebraska political campaigns. For corporate 
and social networks, conventional theoretical structures are utilized to find the new database of 
those networks for Koch Industries and TD Ameritrade. The new theoretical structure and 
database discovered in the research is for the campaign contributions of the board directors in the 
corporate and social networks, as they are traced to campaigns for federal offices (see columns I, 
J, K and L of Figure 3 and Tables 1 and 2). The new political campaign finance structure 
discovered here includes thousands of interconnected campaign finance conduits through which 
money flows to political campaigns.    
 Key words: corporate networks, campaign contributions, PAC conduits                                          
JEL Codes: B52, D72, Z18 
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Clearly, powerful global interests have become more active in influencing policies, legislation, 
research, and political elections of states in the United States. One such interest often mentioned 
in recent media reports is Koch Industries Inc.  However, Koch Industries does not function 
alone and has not obtained its power and influence by functioning alone. It belongs to a powerful 
network of economic, social, and political organizations whose policies and actions are 
coordinated through integrated decision makers.  Without an understanding of the integrated 
networks, it is not possible to understand how Koch has become so powerful in government. The 
purpose here is to examine two integrated corporate, social, and political networks that have 
become active in the State of Nebraska. The two networks which operate with similar political 
and ideological interests are the networks to which Koch Industries Inc. and TD Ameritrade 
Holding Corporation belong. They are often referred to as “the Koch brothers” and “the Ricketts 
family” respectively1. Those atomistic descriptors are misnomers because without the extensive 
network to which these families belong, they would neither have much power nor draw such 
attention.     
 The immense power that corporations have gained over the governance of political and 
social organizations cannot be understood without an understanding of the integrated corporate 
base that is their foundation for power. The foundation reaches beyond the integrated 
corporations to social and political institutions. This is completed by corporate directors and 
officers becoming directors and decision makers in social organizations and by their providing 
money to ideologically approved foundations, university and nonprofit research groups, political 
parties, political action committees (PACs), lobbying efforts, political campaigns, and so forth. 
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Governance and resource allocation decisions are spread from corporate networks to 
government, social, and political organizations. Through this system, corporation directors and 
officers become the nation’s de facto social and economic planners—although not prepared to be 
so by either education or experience.  
Foundation of Corporate/Social/Political Network is  
the Interlocked Corporate Boards of Directors 
The scientific literature that establishes the importance, power, and reach of corporate 
interlocking directorships is long, deep, and extensive. The importance of interlocking 
directorships in establishing powerful corporate conglomerates was established by 1900, and, 
since then, studies from numerous disciplines have documented more specific relationships 
between the interlocking directorships and other concerns (see Appendix A). The interest here is 
the relationship between interlocking corporate directorships and the financing of political 
campaigns.  
It is important to recognize that what has been found in political science and sociology 
about the cohesion among corporate elites and between corporate elites and political decision 
makers reflects Aristotle’s remark that things “which the political arts examines admit of much 
dispute and variability.” However, with regard to cohesion among elites, defined by those who 
hold corporate directorship positions and those who make similar campaign contributions, there 
is much less dispute. An excellent review of the literature on this subject, in addition to being an 
excellent analysis of the patterns found among corporate elites and campaign contributions, is by 
Val Burris (2005). He found significant political cohesion among those within corporate 
directorship networks made up of interlocked boards of directors (BODs) for both direct and 
indirect interlocks. “Directors who create those interlocks among firms are also, as individuals, 
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likely to exhibit similarities of political behavior” (273). The reasons for such similarities 
“include processes of information exchange, persuasion, deference, and conformity with group 
norms of the sort that have been extensively studied in the structurally oriented literature on 
political behavior and opinion formation (see Knoke [1990] for a review)” (273). Close 
proximity of direct and indirect interlocks is significantly associated with similarities of political 
behavior; however, “even at a distance of four or five links, indirect ties remain significantly 
associated with similarity of political behavior” (275). The BOD ties “are stronger by several 
magnitudes than the effects of shared characteristics, like common industry or geographic 
proximity . . .” for determining political cohesiveness measured by campaign contributions [as 
the dependent variable] (273). “For individual directors, both direct and indirect ties are 
significantly associated with similarity of political contributions” (273). Thus, the scientific 
foundation is sufficient to undertake analysis based on campaign contributions from members of 
a network of corporate board interlocks in order to identify the political influence of such a 
network. That is one conceptual basis for the analysis below, but not by limiting the analysis to 
direct campaign contributions between BOD persons and campaigns, because, as will become 
clear, direct connections alone do not sufficiently identify contributions.   
The relationship between interlocking corporate directorships and the financing of 
corporate political campaigns is articulated below by examining the corporate networks formed 
by interlocking directorships of Koch Industries Inc. and TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation, 
and the extension of those networks into social and political networks, with special attention to 
their financing of political campaigns for elected federal offices to represent the State of 
Nebraska. Those two networks have established political campaigns for the conservative—
extreme right wing is the term often used in media reports—takeover of Nebraska’s political 
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governance. National media reports clarify that the Koch network pursues such activities on a 
regular basis in many states across the nation while TD Ameritrade is devoted mainly to 
Nebraska in terms of state activities. The corporate network that forms the foundation for such 
political takeover is not often recognized. The research here relies on the scientific foundation 
about interlocking corporate directorships that function to amass power in the corporate world 
through cooperation among and planning by their networks. In the field of economics, these 
interdependent corporate decision networks are referred to as cooperative oligopolies, shared 
oligopolies, shared decision networks, and so forth. Given the economic and financial power 
concentrated in such networks, the corporations, in addition to planning among themselves, are 
in a position to reach out to include social and political organizations in their sphere of influence. 
The unified corporate/social/political networks serve to influence social movements, change 
laws, establish policies, initiate research agendas, and influence political outcomes in order to 
enhance the economic, financial, and political interests of the corporations and their officers and 
directors.  
As explained by Hayden, Wood, and Kaya, concerns about interlocking directorships 
date back to the late 1800s, and have been of special interest to institutionalist scholars (2002, 
694-5). Gardiner C. Means was the first to complete a study of the interlocking directorships of 
the 250 largest US corporations in an adjacency matrix format . . . in order to identify the 
corporations’ interest groups, such as the JP Morgan, DuPont, and Chicago interest groups 
(Means 1939). John Munkirs and James Sturgeon found that interest groups in the banking, 
automobile, and petroleum industries functioned as “cooperative oligopolies” consistent with 
their interlocking directorships (Munkirs et al. 1993; Munkirs and Sturgeon 1985; Munkirs 
1985).  Institutional studies about power and dominance through corporate interlocking 
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directorships have been a common theme (Trebing and Estabrooks 1998; Munkirs 1985).  
Munkirs found the extensive BOD interlocks are formulated to conduct centralized private sector 
planning (CPSP) (1985, 52-53). “Within the context of CPSP, boards of directors perform two 
distinct, yet interdependent, roles. . . . They are one of the important interstitial elements in 
forming an organizational structure conducive to CPSP; and, they may also be viewed as a 
functional planning tool.” (1985, 83). Adjacency matrixes, as outlined by Means, have been 
manipulated in numerous ways with the development of matrix manipulation technologies based 
on Boolean algebra to derive coefficients for reachability, centrality, degree, and closeness 
(Stephenson and Hayden 1995 and Hayden and Stephenson 1993).  
 In general, the institutionalist literature has emphasized that the coordinated power 
concentrated in the interlocked BODs of large corporations is inconsistent with democratically 
controlled socioeconomic institutions for formulating the political economy. Yet, institutionalists 
have not demonstrated how the integrated BODs seek to determine who is elected to the U.S. 
Congress, even though members of Congress are responsible for the laws and rules that 
determine the political economy. The conception and explanation of neither the CPSP by 
Munkirs nor the corporate power-bloc sets by Hayden, Wood, and Kaya articulate the means 
through which those institutions gain power in Congress.  To trace the use of campaign 
contributions from particular integrated BODs to political campaigns of politicians pursuing 
national public office is the purpose here. The integrated BODs that institutionalists have 
identified as a foundation of economic power are found below to exercise political power as 
well.  
Overlapping Corporate Linear Triples 
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Two corporations can fully and effectively coordinate decisions by having top officers or 
directors from the two corporations on the board of a third corporation
 
(see Hayden, Woods, and 
Kaya 2002). This is a format of three corporate boards connected in a row
2
. The format of three 
entities so aligned is called a linear triple. A real-world example of such a linear triple is outlined 
across Figure 1, made up of Koch Industries Inc., Invista Inc., and E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co. Each oval represents the board of the corporation which has its name in the oval. The arrows 
between ovals indicate the sharing of directors between boards. Directors from Koch Industries 
[Figure 1 about here] 
and DuPont serve as board directors on the board of directors of Invista, thus, the interests, 
needs, and plans of both Koch and DuPont can be explained and considered in board 
deliberations, committee meetings, and research of Invista. In a similar manner, the same can be 
carried to Koch and DuPont board meetings from Invista deliberations and activities. Therefore, 
the interests, needs, and plans of all three corporations are considered together because all board 
members have the responsibility to look out for the interests of the corporations on whose boards 
they serve. A prudent board member needs to share and protect the interests of all boards upon 
which he or she serves in all board meetings, therefore, board deliberations lead to decision 
coordination among the corporations.    
 Figure 1 demonstrates how the linear triple of Koch Industries Inc.—Invista Inc.—
DuPont reaches across other real-world triples to generate 10 overlapping triples. In none of the 
ten sets are the same three corporations in a different order because a different order among the 
three in a set does not make the reachability different. All three can reach each other for making 
decisions together irrespective of order
3
. The 10 triples are: 
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1. Encore Energy—Intrust Financial Corp.—Koch Industries Inc. 
2. Intrust Financial Corp.—Koch Industries Inc.—Invista Inc. 
3. Koch Industries Inc.—Invista Inc.—Georgia Pacific 
4. Koch Industries Inc.—Invista Inc.—Deere and Company 
5. Georgia Pacific—Invista Inc. —Deere and Company 
6. Koch Industries Inc. —Invista Inc. —E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
7. Georgia-Pacific—Invista Inc. —E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
8. Deere and Company—Invista Inc. —E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
9. Invista Inc. —E.I. DuPont de Nemours—Goldman Sachs 
10. E.I. DuPont de Nemours—Goldman Sachs—ExxonMobil 
As this list clarifies, every three-corporation decision set contains two of the same corporations 
from another set, thus cementing the overlap of corporations into a continuous network. The 
decisions made within each triple can be carried to other corporations through the network as the 
triples overlap two-by-two across the decision network.  
Corporate Networks of Koch Industries Inc. and TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation 
Figure 1 is a simple example of partial information in order to clarify how linear triples of the 
corporate world overlap with each other to form a network. The full Koch Industries Inc. 
corporate network is, in fact, much more complicated than the example in Figure 1; with many 
more directorship interlocks among the corporations, with far more overlapping triples, and, 
therefore, with more decision reachability among corporations that can be utilized to coordinate 
planning and cement power as the corporations work together. The full Koch corporate network 
of linear triples for 2009 is demonstrated in Figure 2 (data is from columns A through F in Table 
1 below). Each rectangle in Figure 2 represents the board of directors of the corporation’s name 
10 
 
in the rectangle. The sharing of directors among corporations is represented by the lines that 
connect the rectangles. The same kind of corporate network of linear triples for 2009 exists for 
TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation (data is from columns A through F in Table 2 below).   
[Figure 2 about here] 
Databases for Corporate Networks of Koch Industries and TD Ameritrade 
Figure 3 is utilized as an abbreviated introduction to the databases for the corporate networks of 
Koch Industries and TD Ameritrade found in Tables 1 and 2. Given the size of Tables 1 and 2, 
they are not available in the text but are available at website www._________________. The 
columnar headings in Figure 3 are the same as for columns C through L in Tables 1 and 2.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
 The first row of Figure 3 indicates that the corporation name (column C) is TD 
Ameritrade Holding Corporation, which has a director (column D) named J. Peter Ricketts who 
is on the corporate BOD of TD Ameritrade (column E) and on the corporate BOD of the 
corporation Alumni Capital Network (column F). Ricketts is also on the BOD and is president of 
The Platte Institute for Economic Research, Inc. (columns G and H).  
 The information in columns C through E continues to be repeated in subsequent rows as 
long as there is new information to be reported about the person in column D in any column to 
the right of column D.  
The second row of Figure 3 indicates that Ricketts is on the board of trustees of the 
American Enterprise Institute (columns G and H). 
The third row indicates that Ricketts, the director of TD Ameritrade, donated money to 
the PAC named For Our Republic’s Traditions (column I). For Our Republic’s Traditions is 
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designated as a primary monetary recipient because it is the first recipient of funds in a conduit 
of funds that reaches the campaign of Lee Terry, who was the Republican candidate in the 
Second Congressional District in Nebraska and was elected to the U.S. House of 
Representatives. For Our Republic’s Traditions donates money to the secondary monetary 
recipient, which is the National Republican Congressional Committee (column J), and, in 
column K, the tertiary monetary recipient is Lee Terry's campaign, which received a contribution 
from the National Republican Congressional Committee. 
The fourth row of Figure 3 indicates that William H. Hatanaka is another member of the 
BOD of TD Ameritrade. He is also a member of the BOD of TD Waterhouse Canada, Inc. and a 
member of the BOD of York University Foundation. 
The last three rows of Figure 3 deal with Koch Industries, Inc. The first of the Koch 
Industries rows indicates that Joe Moeller is a BOD member of Koch Industries, a BOD member 
of the corporation Invista Inc., and member of the board of trustees at the University of Tulsa. 
The next-to-the-last row indicates that Joe Moeller contributed to Koch Industries Political 
Action Committee, which donated to the PAC named 21st Century Majority Fund, which 
donated to the tertiary recipient Johanns for Senate Incorporated. The latter was the election 
campaign fund of Republican Michael Johanns, who was elected as Nebraska’s U.S. Senator. As 
indicated, the Johanns for Senate campaign received its funds as the quadruciary monetary 
recipient in the example in the last row of Figure 3. Joe Moeller made a contribution to Koch 
Industries Political Action Committee, which contributed to Blue Dog Political Action 
Committee, which contributed to Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc. NonPartisan Political 
Action Committee for Good Government, which contributed to Johanns for Senate Incorporated. 
Although other studies have examined the relationships between corporate BOD 
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members and political campaigns, the authors have not found other studies that have identified 
the provision of money through conduits as outlined in Table 3. Other’s studies usually identify 
only direct contributions from BOD members to political campaigns or campaign PACs. That 
approach would not take account of any of the monetary conduits that delivered donations to the 
campaigns of Lee Terry and Michael Johanns as outlined in Figure 3. They would not be 
reported in such studies.   As defined next in Tables 1 and 2, that approach would also exclude 
thousands of other conduits that begin with contributions from the Koch Industries and TD 
Ameritrade corporate BOD members.  
The methodology and databases of Tables 1 and 2 are explained here in detail in order for 
the readers to gain a full understanding of the analysis completed, be in a position to offer 
criticism, make comparisons with other studies, and be able to replicate this study for other 
states. The databases for the corporate networks of Koch Industries and TD Ameritrade are found 
in columns A through F in Tables 1 and 2. The databases for the social networks that accompany 
the corporate networks are found in columns G and H. The political networks that accompany 
the corporate networks are found in columns I through L. The political networks are composed 
of monetary donation conduits that provide money through many different PACs before it 
reaches political candidates. Tables 1 and 2 are formatted in Excel spreadsheets that are 
presented as electronic documents at (as specified above) permanent website 
www.__________________ 4.  
Corporate Interlock Database for Koch Industries Inc.  
The database of the corporate network of Koch Industries Inc. in Figure 2 is found in Table 1 
titled Database for the Corporate, Social, and Political Network of Koch Industries Inc., which 
contains the connections among board members, officers, PACs, social organizations, and 
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campaign contributions. In the table, the name of an entity in each column is repeated for as 
many rows as necessary to make it possible to relate the information in the columns to the right 
of that column to the information in the original column. Information in columns A through H is 
for the year 2009. (Source references for all information in Tables 1 and 2 are found in columns 
M through P.) Columns A through F in Table 1 are formatted as follows.  
 Column A, Counter: When a row is referred to below, it will be referring to the counter 
row in column A, not the Excel numbered labels that appear on the left side of each row. 
 Column B, Corporations Ticker: The corporation stock ticker for the corporation of 
interest in column C is in column B. N/A in Column B means the corporation does not have a 
ticker because its stock is not publicly traded.  
 Column C, Corporation Name: Column C contains the name of the corporation for 
which network information has been collected for the relevant row. Koch Industries Inc. is the 
first corporation listed in column C. Koch Industries is repeated in rows 1 through 415 in order to 
relate the information to Koch Industries in the columns to the right of column C back to column 
C. The same corporation’s name is repeated in column C for as many rows as needed to express 
all the information related to that corporation in the columns to the right of column C.   
  Column D, Officer/Director: The name of the director or officer (if one of the top five 
officers) who is on the board of directors for the corporation in column C and the corporation in 
column F is in column D. For example, following row 314 across from column C is the name of 
Charles G. Koch in column D. He is listed 30 times in column D (rows 312 to 341) because of all 
the information related to him in columns to the right of column D. Some corporate board 
members listed in column D of Tables 1 and 2 belong to few corporate boards in column F; 
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however, they are listed more times in column D than their number of corporation directorship 
positions because of their positions with social organizations listed in column G or because they 
are listed as a donor in a column to the right of column H.  
  Column E, Title/Position: Column E contains the title or position of the person in 
column D within the corporation in column C. Row 314 in column E indicates, for example, that 
Charles G. Koch is a CEO and member of the BOD of Koch Industries Inc.  
 Column F, Interlocked Corporation: The name of the corporation for which a 
corporate directorship interlock exists with the corporation in column C is in column F for the 
year 2009. For example, in row 314, Charles G. Koch (column D) is a director (column E) on the 
board of Koch Industries and a director on the board of directors of Georgia-Pacific in column F. 
If a subsidiary corporation has its own board of directors separate from its parent, it is considered 
to be a separate board in this study. 
 The corporations found in column F for rows 1 through 415 are the corporations which 
have a member of their board also being a member of Koch Industries, or, stated differently, 
those corporations share a direct interlock with Koch Industries. The corporations in column F 
are displayed in Figure 2 as the first circle of corporations around Koch Industries Inc. The lines 
connecting those corporations with Koch Industries Inc. in Figure 2 represent the directors listed 
in rows 1 through 415 in column D of Table 1. 
 The corporations identified in rows 1 through 415 of column F are, in turn, listed in rows 
416 through 575 of column C in order to find the corporations with which they are directly 
interlocked in column F of rows 416 through 575, in order to complete the linear triple. For 
example, in row 312 Charles G. Koch is entered as a director on the boards of Koch Industries 
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Inc. (column C) and Invista, Inc. in column F; and, in turn, in row 431, Gary M. Pfeiffer, who 
serves as a director on the board of Invista, Inc. with Charles G. Koch, is also on the board of E.I.  
DuPont de Nemours & Co in column F. The corporations listed in column F of rows 416 through 
575 are the corporations placed outside of the first circle of corporations in Figure 2, and their 
directorship connections with the first circle of corporations are indicated with the lines 
connecting the two.   
 As is clear in column F, there are no entries in some rows. This is because an entry in a 
row in a later column in Table 1 refers back to an entry in a row of a column prior to column F, 
for example when a person’s name that applies to later columns has already been entered in a 
row in prior column D. In Table 1, Joe Moeller is listed in counter rows 1 and 2 in column D 
because he is a director on the boards of the corporations listed in both counter row 1 (Invista 
Inc.) and counter row 2 (Georgia-Pacific LLC) of column F, so there are entries in rows 1 and 2 
of column F. In addition, Moeller made a political contribution in row 3  to Koch Industries 
Political Action Committee in column I, thus, row 3 is vacant in column F because the 
contribution entry in column I does not refer back to a corporation in column F—it refers back to 
him in column D. 
Corporate Interlock Database for TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation 
The database of the corporate network for TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation is found in Table  
2 titled Database for the Corporate, Social, and Political Network of TD Ameritrade Holding 
Corporation that contains the connections among board members, officers, PACs, social 
organizations, and campaign contributions. The layout and format of Table 2 is the same as 
explained above for Table 1.   
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Social Networks of Koch Industries Inc. 
and TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation 
The social network is the network constructed by the linkages of social organizations specified in 
columns G and H, with the corporate network found in columns C through F in Tables 1 and 2.  
The same persons that link corporations to each other also link the corporations with the social 
organizations. The database for the social network is found in columns D, G, and H of Tables 1 
and 2. The linkages between the corporate boards and social organizations allow for the 
coordination of decisions between the two and across social organizations. The person listed in 
column D for the corporation in column C holds a position in the social organization listed in 
column G. That position is specified in column H. An example for Koch Industries network in 
row 420 of Table 1 is Charles O. Holliday who serves on the board of directors of E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co. and on the board of governors of the Partnership for Public Service in column G. 
An example for the TD Ameritrade network in row 41 in Table 2 is Allan R. Tessler, who serves 
on the board directors of TD Ameritrade and on the board of governors of Boys and Girls Clubs 
of America in column G.  
 A similarity discovered from this database is that both Koch Industries and TD 
Ameritrade have one director who specializes in holding a large number of important positions 
with social organizations. Other board members in these companies hold positions in social 
organizations but not the large number held by David H. Koch from Koch Industries and J. Peter 
Ricketts from TD Ameritrade. David H. Koch holds such positions with 24 social organizations 
(see rows 342-365, column G, Table 1), which include board of director positions as follows: 
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Johns Hopkins University, The Aspen Institute, The Reason Foundation, American Legislative 
Exchange Council (ALEC), and The Cato Institute. He is also a founder of the Americans for 
Prosperity Foundation and FreedomWorks. J. Peter Ricketts holds such positions with 14 social 
organizations (see rows 1-14, column G, Table 2) which include board of director and board of 
trustee positions as follows: American Enterprise Institute, The Platte Institute for Economic 
Research, Education Opportunity Nebraska, Nebraskans for Fiscal Accountability, and 
Opportunity Education Foundation. 
 The 49 social organizations listed in column G of Table 1 for the Koch network are 
interlaced with the Koch Industries corporate network in Figure 2 that was taken from columns C 
and F in Table 1.  Likewise, the 76 social organizations in column G of Table 2 for the TD 
Ameritrade are interlaced with the Ameritrade corporate network in columns C and F in Table 2.    
Political Networks of Koch Industries Inc. and 
 
TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation 
 
The intertwined corporations and social organizations extend their decision-making power into 
the political arena through monetary contributions to political campaigns, think tanks, research 
foundations, universities, economic education, and so forth—contributions made by persons 
holding the top decision making positions in the corporate and social networks. The monetary 
contributions are made by the persons (in column D) who hold decision making positions in the 
corporations and social organizations of columns F and G. The primary, secondary, tertiary, and 
quadruciary recipients of such monetary contributions are reported in columns I, J, K, and L 
respectively in Tables 1 and 2 for the 2008 election cycle
5
.   
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Column I: Recipient of Monetary Donations 
The designation of column I as the primary recipients of monetary donations from persons in 
column D means the organization in column I is either the first and final recipient or the primary 
recipient in a series of donations that form a conduit which carries money to other organizations.  
Examples of the latter case will be presented below in the explanation of columns J, K, and L. 
Examples of the former case are:                                                                                                   
(1) Donation from Charles G. Koch (row 321, column D) to primary recipient American 
Legislative Exchange Council
6
 in row 321 of column I in Table 1.                                              
(2) Donation from J. Peter Ricketts (row 26, column D) to primary recipient Adrian Smith for 
Congress in row 26 of column I in Table 2.                                                                                 
The primary recipients in these examples do not donate funds to other organizations. 
Column J: Secondary Recipient of Political Funds 
The designation of column J as the secondary recipient of political funds from the organization 
in column I means that the organization in column J is either the second and final recipient in a 
sequence of political contributions or the secondary organization in a sequence that provides 
money to other organizations. Examples of the latter case will be presented below in the 
explanation of columns K and L. Examples of the former case are:                                             
(1) Donation from Joe Moeller (row 3, column D) to primary recipient Koch Industries PAC 
(row 3, column I), and a donation from the latter to secondary recipient Lee Terry for Congress 
in row 3 of column J in Table 1.                                                                                                    
(2) Donation from J. Peter Ricketts (row 23, column D) to primary recipient Sandhills PAC (row 
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23, column I), and a donation from the latter to secondary recipient Johanns for Senate 
Incorporated in row 23 of column J in Table 2.                                                                           
The secondary recipients in these examples do not donate funds to other organizations.  
 When the designation of a series of contributions in columns J, K, and L is the same that 
was reported elsewhere in those columns, a note indicates where that information is found and 
does not repeat it. For example, row 323 of column J of Table 1 reads: “See Counter Rows 2-307 
of columns J, K, and L.” This means that all the information in those rows and columns is 
repeated as donations that come from Koch Industries PAC in both cases. They are different as 
total sets because the set in rows 2-307 (columns J, K, and L) originated with Joe Moeller 
(column C), while the repeated set designated for columns J, K, and L at row 323 originated with 
Charles G. Koch. Thus, although the initial donations are from different men, their donations 
feed into the same pattern of conduits in the political network.  
Column K: Tertiary Recipients of Political Funds 
The designation of column K as the recipients of political funds from the organization in column 
J means that the organization in column J is either the third and final recipient in a conduit of 
political contributions or the third organization in a conduit which provides money to other 
organizations. Examples of the latter case will be presented below in the explanation of column 
L. Examples of the former case are:                                                                                               
(1) Donation from William B. Moore (row 495, column D) to primary recipient Powerpac of the 
Edison Electric Institute (row 495 , column I),  donation from the latter to secondary recipient 
Next Century Fund (row 495, column J ), and a donation from  the latter to tertiary recipient 
Johanns for Senate Incorporated in row 495 of column K in Table 1.                                           
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(2) Donation from Donald J. Carty (row 134, column D) to primary recipient Dell, Inc. 
Employee PAC (row 134, column I), donation from the latter to secondary recipient Every 
Republican is Crucial, and  a donation from the latter to tertiary recipient Lee Terry for Congress 
in row  134 of column K in Table 2.                                                                                             
The tertiary recipients in these examples do not donate funds to other organizations.  
Column L: Quadruciary Recipients of Political Funds 
The designation of column L as the recipients of political funds from the organization in column 
K means that the organization in column L is the fourth and final recipient in a conduit of 
political contributions. Examples of this case are:                                                                         
(1) Donation from Joe Moeller (row 14, column D) to primary recipient Koch Industries PAC 
(row 14, column I), donation from the latter to secondary recipient Blue Dog PAC (row 14, 
column J), donation from the latter to tertiary recipient AT&T Inc. Federal PAC (row 14, column 
K), and a donation from the latter to quadruciary recipient Johanns for Senate Incorporated in 
row 14 of column L in Table 1.                                                                                                       
(2) Donation from Mark R. Patterson (row 289, column D) to primary recipient Merrill Lynch & 
Co. PAC (row 289, column I), donation from the latter to secondary recipient Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets Association PAC (row 289, column J), donation from the latter to tertiary 
recipient Continuing a Majority Party PAC (row 289, column K), and a donation from the latter 
to quadruciary recipient Lee Terry for Congress in row 289 of column L in Table 2.            
Quadruciary recipients do not donate funds to other organizations in either the Koch Industries or 
TD Ameritrade networks.    
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Summary Regarding Primary, Secondary, Tertiary, and Quadruciary Recipients 
The examples above of the primary, secondary, tertiary, and quadruciary recipients of monetary 
funds for columns I through L are selected as a means to clarify how the spreadsheets of Tables 1 
and 2 are formatted, not as an attempt to capture the extensive set of different routes through 
which political organizations can obtain funding from the Koch Industries and TD Ameritrade 
networks. The examples clarify how to read Tables 1 and 2, and those tables clarify how U.S. 
Senator Mike Johanns and U.S. Representative Lee Terry received campaign contributions from 
different sequences of PAC donations in a vast interconnected network where directors of the 
Koch Industries and TD Ameritrade corporate networks contributed to the original funds of each 
sequence. The persons who made the contributions to the original funds are identified by their 
positions with the corporations and social organizations in columns C through G in Tables 1 and 
2. In turn, many primary-recipient PACs made decisions to send contributions to secondary-
recipient PACs; the secondary PAC to the tertiary PAC; and the tertiary PAC to the politicians’ 
campaign funds. Thus, information about direct payments to a campaign fund does not reveal the 
network sequence of campaign contributions from a primary to a quadruciary campaign fund. As 
shown in Tables 1 and 2, particular political campaigns receive funds that originate from the 
same source in the same election cycle, separately as a primary recipient, as a secondary 
recipient, as a tertiary recipient, and as a quadruciary recipient. When there is a quadruciary 
recipient, it means that there is a set of five entities (decision nodes) that have made decisions to 
make and accept contributions along the sequenced conduit; the person who is the original 
contributor plus the primary, secondary, tertiary, and quadruciary recipients.  
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Discovery of New Findings 
This study reveals new findings that the authors have not found in prior studies reviewed, as 
follows. 
 First, the conduits that carry monetary donations to election campaigns have not been 
found in past studies.  
Second, a new finding is the specialization of corporate board members with regard to the 
servicing of other corporate boards or social organizations.  Such specialization might have been 
expected, as specialization is the norm in organizations; however, it has not been noted in past 
studies. We stated earlier that J. Peter Ricketts of TD Ameritrade and David H. Koch of Koch 
Industries specialize in taking positions with social organizations rather than being active in 
serving on corporate boards, while others on their boards serve on a number of corporate boards. 
J. Peter Ricketts also specializes as a member of the TD Ameritrade board in being involved with 
political PACs more than other TD Ameritrade directors. Not all the corporations studied here 
practiced such specialization. Other directors who did specialize (see Table 2) are: J. Brett 
Harvey with Barrick Gold Corporation, Abigail S. Wexner with Limited Brands, Inc., and John 
Raymond Tozzi with EnerCrest, Inc. all of whom specialize in being involved with social 
organizations; and Mark R. Patterson with Broadpoint, Gleacher Securities Group and David L. 
Hauser with Enpro Industries, Inc. both of whom specialize in being involved with political 
PACs.   
 Third, some PACs  appear to specialize as screening organizations to determine what  
PACs and campaigns are appropriate to receive money from other PACs that appear earlier in 
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funding sequences in the networks. Specialization for the development of such organizational 
niches should be expected. An example is Blue Dog PAC. Although the number of Democrats in 
the Blue Dog Coalition has had a substantial decrease in membership in the House of 
Representatives (due to failure to be reelected), the Blue Dog PAC continues to be a major 
source of PAC funds. It specializes in taking funds from a large number of persons and other 
PACs and provides funds to a large number of different PACs and campaigns through numerous 
different funding conduits in both the Koch Industries and TD Ameritrade networks. 
 Fourth, information in the political networks in columns I, J,K, and L of Tables 1 and 2 
demonstrates that Koch Industries and TD Ameritrade networks both make political 
contributions to some of the same PACs that support interconnected conduits of campaign 
financing that carry funds to the same political campaigns. For those columns, there are 256 
different political organizations for the Koch Industries network and 238 different political 
entities for the TD Ameritrade network, and 146 are the same organizations for the two political 
networks. The entries in each network are formed into thousands of different combinations of 
political campaign conduits for each network, as identified in those columns. The most 
prominent PACs and campaigns in Table 1 for the Koch Industries network are (in alphabetical 
order) Blue Dog, Freedom Fund, Johanns for Senate Incorporated, Koch Industries PAC, 
Nebraska Leadership PAC, Powerpac of the Edison Electric Institute, and The Freedom Project. 
The most prominent PACs and campaign in Table 2 for the Ameritrade network are Blue Dog; 
COALPAC, A PAC of the National Mining Association; Dell, Inc. Employee PAC; Duke 
Energy Corporation PAC; Johanns for Senate Incorporated; Merrill Lynch & Co. PAC; and The 
Freedom Project. All entries in both of these two lists appear in both political networks.  
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 The closer the two networks move to a real-world political expression of ideological 
beliefs—that is, into the funding of political campaigns to achieve their ideological goals—the 
greater the degree of overlap between the activities of the two networks. When the concern is to 
harness government for common ideological beliefs, the two networks come together. The two 
networks share only one of the same corporations (Unisys Corp) in their corporate networks and 
only one of the same social organizations (The Conservation Fund) in their social networks; 
however, as is clear from Tables 1 and 2, in their political networks, the two networks have many 
of the same PACs appearing in similar overlapping conduits in both networks that deliver money 
to the same political campaigns.    
 A dozen examples of conduits with quadruciary recipients taken from columns I, J, K, 
and L in Tables 1 and 2 are presented in Table 3 to clarify the commonality between the two  
[Table 3 about here] 
 political networks. Each conduit set contains five entries, with the network and corporate person 
making the original contribution in the left column and the political campaign receiving the 
contribution in the right column. Upon inspection of Table 3, it is clear that each conduit entry 
overlaps with other conduit entries. The Koch network reaches Blue Dog PAC via Koch 
Industries PAC while the TD Ameritrade network reaches Blue Dog PAC via Dell. The Koch 
network reaches Powerpac of Edison Electric Institute directly while the TD Ameritrade network 
reaches Powerpac of Edison Electric Institute via Duke Energy Corporation PAC, and both reach 
John S. Fund via Powerpac of Edison Electric Institute. The Koch network reaches The Freedom 
Project via Koch Industries PAC while the TD Ameritrade Network reaches The Freedom 
Project via COALPAC, A PAC of the National Mining Association. The Koch network reaches 
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the American Express Company PAC via the connection between Koch Industries PAC and The 
Freedom Project while the TD Ameritrade network reaches the American Express Company 
Express PAC via the connection between the Merrill Lynch & Co. PAC and the Growth and 
Prosperity PAC.  These examples from Table 3 represent what is common in Tables 1 and 2, and 
demonstrate that the Koch and TD Ameritrade networks actively participate with many of the 
same PACs. It is clear upon inspection of columns I, J, K, and L in Tables 1 and 2 that such 
common participation multiplies profusely. Corporate networks that may not have reasons for 
interlocking directorships with each other in their corporate activities come together to influence 
elections and public policy where they share common political interests. 
 Finally, this research clarifies that corporations are not just concerned with making 
political contributions to PACs representing their own industry. Instead, as demonstrated in 
columns I, J, K, and L of Tables 1 and 2, they make contributions to many different kinds of 
PACs, and those PACs make contributions to more different kinds of PACs. This allows for a 
broad based net of influence so politicians are getting pressure from many different sources to 
fulfill a common ideology.    
Further Research Needed  
Given the findings above, the research about the Koch and TD Ameritrade networks should be 
extended in order to more fully explain the power of those networks.  
 One set of research that needs to be completed is to develop the political network 
established from the initial donations made by the corporations listed in columns C and F in 
Tables 1 and 2. Tables 1 and 2 contain only the initial donations of the persons listed in column 
D. These tables do not include donations made by the corporations in columns C and F. That 
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research should be completed in order to further define the power of these corporate networks on 
the state. None of that information is in this study.    
 Second, research that should be completed is to extend the political network developed 
by donations for PACs, political campaigns, and advocacy research within Nebraska. The 
political information in Tables 1 and 2 is concentrated mainly on campaigns for federal offices. It 
did not deal with the funds going to campaigns for state and local offices—the governor, state 
senators, county clerks, and so forth.  For example, Nebraska Attorney General Jon Bruning 
established a “leadership PAC” named Citizens for a Better Nebraska. Such PACs are formed by 
politicians to help fund the campaigns of other politicians in an effort to prove party loyalty and 
to further their goal of being elected to a higher office. Citizens for a Better Nebraska received 
funds from Koch Industries Inc. and distributed funds to campaigns within the state for city, 
county, and state offices, as well as to Republican parties in some counties.  
 Third, a study of Tables 1 and 2 reveals that although most political campaign funds are 
received through secondary, tertiary, or quadruciary conduits, some BOD donors contribute 
directly to campaigns. It appears, as a causal observation of Table 3 reveals, that many different 
conduits deliver to the same campaigns, and that the conduits overlap in such a manner so that 
coordination is obvious. Other events being equal, the more links in the conduit, the more money 
that is amassed to give to a campaign, thus giving the contributors more influence. Or, stated 
differently, a quadruciary delivery exhibits more power than a secondary one. Also, as the 
numerous conduits come together, there is more political clout to win elections and gain 
influence with the official who is elected. So why do some BOD donors make contributions only 
as primary donations? More research is needed to answer that question.  
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 Fourth, if the kind of data found in this paper can be collected for a series of election 
cycles, it makes sense to conduct Boolean network analysis such as centrality, betweeness 
centrality, and reachability so those network coefficients can be included as variables in a long-
term statistical analysis.   
Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, we see that the analysis here confirms what is already contained in prior scientific  
literature in some cases and discovers new findings that we should expect to see replicated in 
studies in other states. Three confirmations of past analysis regarding interlocked corporate 
boards are as follows.  
First, the finding about corporate networks formed through interlocking corporate boards 
of directors is consistent with prior literature on the subject (although the database here for Koch 
Industries and TD Ameritrade is new). Corporate boards of large corporations are sufficiently 
interconnected to provide for planning among the corporations in the network. There appears to 
be little overlap between the Koch Industries and TD Ameritrade corporate networks; as 
indicated by comparing Tables 1 and 2, Unisys Corp. is the only corporation common to both 
corporate networks. Yet, the BOD network of each is extensive and highly interlocked through a 
set of corporate linear triples, as displayed in Figure 2.  
Second, the finding about social networks formed between corporations and social 
organizations by the same persons holding decision-making positions in corporate and social 
organizations are consistent with prior literature on the subject (although the database here for 
Koch Industries and TD Ameritrade is new). The interconnected corporate and social networks 
make it possible for corporate directors to influence the ideological complexion and planning of 
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the social organizations. It also helps to maintain the ideological norms of the directors who are 
regularly in contact with each other through the board activities of both the corporate and social 
organizations, as is demonstrated with their political contributions. 
Third, institutionalists, and sociologists and political scientists in general, have found that 
social activities are best explained by understanding the activities within the social systems in 
which they are embedded (Polanyi 1957; Knoke 1990). As this study has found, “social ties 
among actors have significant consequences for political action that go beyond anything that can 
be explained in terms of attributes measured at the level of the individual actor” (Burris 2005, 
279). Therefore, consistent with current literature, the general finding in this study is that the 
activity, in terms of political contributions, is consistent with the needs of the corporate and 
social networks.   
New conclusions from this analysis are as follows. 
 First, although the literature reviewed does not include the relationship between different 
corporate networks that influence elections in a state through overlapping PAC contributions, the 
findings here are consistent with the political science theories of Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. 
Jenkins-Smith regarding the importance of normative beliefs and ideology for the successful 
advocacy of government policy. Ideology is an integrated set of integrated normative beliefs, and 
the studies of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith found that “stakeholder beliefs and behavior are 
embedded within informal networks . . .” (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 196).  In the study here, 
beliefs and behavior of the Koch Industries and TD Ameritrade networks are embedded in the 
informal networks found in Figure 3 and Tables 1, 2, and 3. To enforce coordinated behavior 
within the networks, actors form groups as “a set of people from a variety of positions . . . who 
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share a particular belief system . . . and who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity 
over time” (Sabatier 1999, 267). The persons identified in Figure 3 and Tables 1, 2, and 3 who 
hold a variety of positions within the corporate and social networks of Koch Industries and TD 
Ameritrade, mainly share a particular belief system and show a non-trivial degree of coordinated 
activity through political donations to PACs in order to elect government officials consistent 
with their policy beliefs for government. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith also found that policy 
beliefs are powerful in determining government activities because advocacy groups build 
coalitions around the policy beliefs (1999, 142-143). Such power is expressed by the overlapping 
PACs in the network coalitions articulated in Tables 1 and 2 and 3.  
 Second, we can observe a real-world example of what sociologists refer to as a 
communication network that keeps a system functioning. The communication network observed 
here is a system of interlaced monetary channels that have been woven together for the 
communication of the networks’ ideological beliefs through monetary contributions. In other 
words, money speaks.   
 Third, it is clear from this analysis that the political funding conduits reach from the 
global centers into state election campaigns, thereby circumventing a system of federalism. The 
same is true with regard to funding for foundations, research centers, and advocacy groups. 
Communities do not get to make decisions about corporate board membership, campaign 
financing, and the channels that carry financing into the electoral processes.   When the 
economic power of two global networks like that of Koch Industries and TD Ameritrade is 
brought to bear on the selection of political leaders, the citizens of the state are at a disadvantage 
because their needs are infrequently considered in lawmaking and delivery of essential public 
services such as child welfare, public education, environmental protection, and so forth.  
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 Finally, as a reviewer stated, this work “gives powerful evidence that BOD interlocks (or 
intralocks) have morphed into machines for the consolidation and exercise of polit ical power 
among entities with coalescent economic interests. This aspect of the problem is not discussed in 
Munkirs.” 
Notes 
1. Koch Industries Inc. and TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation were not selected because they 
are dominate industries in the state of Nebraska.  Their commercial activities are spread 
globally, to include Nebraska.  They were selected because they are major political actors in 
the state.  
Media sources have recognized the monetary devotion of the Koch brothers to 
conservative causes for some decades. More recently, “the brothers have funded opposition 
campaigns against so many Obama Administration policies—from health-care reform to the 
economic-stimulus program—that, in political circles, their ideological network is known as 
the Kochtopus” (Mayer 30 August 2010).  They have also understood that if they are to have 
clout in Washington, D.C., it is important to influence the election of members of Congress. 
That has involved them in state campaigns for Congressional offices across the nation.  
As the Koch brothers are active in most states, they join in common political efforts with 
other groups that have similar ideological interests. In Nebraska, it is with the Ricketts 
family. In other states, they are allies with others, for example, with Art Pope’s organization 
in North Carolina, (Mayer 30 August 2012).    
Koch brothers corporations and foundations have taken full advantage of the Citizens 
United  Supreme Court decision (January 21, 2010) that struck down laws which limited or 
31 
 
prohibited  direct spending that corporations and nonprofit organizations can contribute to 
political campaigns. That decision has unleashed huge campaign contributions from the Koch 
and Ricketts nonprofits and corporations. “The most aggressive expansion of the Koch 
Brothers’ effort to influence public policy has come through the Americans for Prosperity, 
which runs both a charitable foundation and a grass-roots-activists group. . . . David Koch is 
chairman of the Americans for Prosperity Foundation” (Mayer 30 August 2012).   
TD Ameritrade was originally founded in Nebraska by Joe Ricketts who is the patriarch  
of  the Ricketts family, and, until recently, much of their campaign activity was directed 
toward Nebraska, with a son J. Peter Ricketts currently serving as a member of the 
Republican National Committee from Nebraska. More recently, the family has become more 
active nationally especially with activities countering President Barack Obama. “Mr. Ricketts 
[Joe] is increasingly putting his fortune to work in conservative politics” (Zeleny and 
Rutenberg 17 May 2012). For example, he contributed to all seven of the Republican 
presidential candidates at some point during the 2011-12 primaries and to the libertarian 
candidate for president (Hartman 18 May 2012). 
2. Studies have confirmed that corporations at each end of a linear quadruple (four corporations  
in a row connected by directorship interlocks) are fully effective at coordinating decisions 
and plans through the two middle corporations: thus, those in a linear triple would also be 
equally effective (see Hayden, Woods, and Kaya).  
3. If there are three corporations, A, B, and C, they are counted as a linear triple if the three are 
connected by a path whereby, for example, corporations A and B share a director or 
directors, and B and C share a director or directors. In many path studies the order along a 
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path is important, and, therefore, A—B—C would be counted as one triple and A—C—B as 
an additional triple because its order is different.  However, in this study they are counted as 
only one triple set because if A and C can effectively reach each other for decision making in 
the first set, then A can effectively coordinate with B and C, so the corporations are already 
capable of working together.  They can coordinate activities and plans without respect to the 
order of the three corporations in the linear set. 
4. The intent in this paper is to emphasize network structure so dollar amounts are not included.  
The dollar amounts of contributions donated to political campaigns are available from the 
authors and at the permanent website address where Tables 1 and 2 are available. 
5. The PACs have sources of contributions other than what is shown in Tables 1 and 2, and    
make donations to PACs and campaigns other than what is shown in Tables 1 and 2. The 
flow of a monetary conduit is analogous to a river in a regional water system. The river 
channel receives water from different sources (aquifers, rain runoff, streams, other rivers) 
and distributes water to other sources (municipal water systems, other rivers, irrigation, 
aquifers, wetlands) A river’s flow would be different without the contributions and 
distributions of each. It is the system network that is important for understanding the final 
flow with rivers and campaign contributions. The interest here is to record all the different 
conduit sequences and to observe how  the sequences overlap with each other in order to 
form the overall networks relevant to our concerns here for Koch Industries and TD 
Ameritrade.  
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6. The American Legislative Exchange Council is a politically conservative organization  
devoted to research, writing legislative bills, and designing legislative strategies in order to 
influence state laws and policies consistent with the wishes of its corporate donors.
Appendix A: Summary of Selected Interlocking Directorate (ILD) Studies 
 
Discipline Author(s) Orientation/Approach Method of 
Investigation 
Unit of 
Investigation 
Key Findings 
Accounting 
(2002) 
April Klein Board Characteristics—inside 
and outside members; 
Investigates the possibility, 
not the existence of interlocks 
Secondary data of 
firm earnings and 
board, audit 
committee 
membership; 
Regression analysis 
Top U.S. public 
corporations 
Reductions in board independence correspond with 
increasing abnormal accruals 
Political 
Science (1988) 
Mark S. 
Mizruchi and 
Linda Brewster 
Stearns 
Board Characteristics—what 
firm and economic conditions 
lead to the appointment of 
financially-linked board 
members. 
Secondary data; 
Longitudinal Event 
History analysis 
from 1956 to 1983 
22 large U.S. 
industrial 
corporations 
Declining firm solvency, profit rates, and the 
corresponding increasing demand for capital with 
falling interest rates and demand for capital with 
business cycle contractions are associated with 
appointment of financial directors. 
Sociology 
(1996) 
Mark S. 
Mizruchi 
Reviews the investigated 
determinants—including 
collusion, cooptation and 
monitoring, legitimacy, career 
advancement, social cohesion; 
and the consequences of 
interlocks—corporate control, 
network embeddedness 
Review of past 
research across 
disciplines and 
approaches 
Varies across 
articles 
reviewed 
There are two main criticisms of interlock research: 
interlocks as represented by quantitative indicators 
fail to account for corporate behavior; and that 
quantitative indicators are not useful and interlocks 
fail to represent board dynamics and inter-firm 
relations. 
Sociology 
(2000) 
Thomas A. 
Lyson and 
Annalisa Lewis 
Raymer 
Board Characteristics—
demographic and social 
characteristics 
Secondary data of 
board members and 
their characteristics 
Ten largest U.S. 
food and 
beverage firms 
The largest U.S. food and beverage firms are linked 
through a variety of indirect social interlocks formed 
by board members 
Political 
Science (1992) 
Gerald F. Davis 
and Suzanne K. 
Stout 
Firm monitoring of 
performance and subsequent 
actions of interlocked actors 
Secondary data, 
Regression analysis 
U.S. Fortune 
500 firms in the 
1980s 
There is no association between the presence of a 
financial interlock on a firm’s board and the 
likelihood of the firm being a target of a takeover bid. 
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Discipline Author(s) Orientation/Approach Method of 
Investigation 
Unit of 
Investigation 
Key Findings 
Economics 
(1979) 
Richard 
Newfarmer 
Transnational corporation 
Interlocks are investigated as a 
means of gaining market 
power 
Secondary data of 
100 largest 
consolidated 
electrical enterprises 
114 TNCs in 
Brazil’s 
electrical 
industry 
Interlocks are found to be a possible positive 
contributor to market power, which in turn accounts 
for a portion of the growth of TNC s beyond 
technology and efficiency 
Economics 
(2002) 
F. Gregory 
Hayden, Kellee 
Wood, and 
Asuman Kaya 
Interconnections and power of 
firms regarding policy. 
Secondary data, 
creation of power 
blocs and use of 
matrix analysis 
Central 
Interstate Low-
Level 
Radioactive 
Waste Compact 
(CIC) 
The CIC is connected through a vast and dense 
network of interlocks through Power Blocs with 
leading financial and Fortune 500 firms. 
Management 
(1981) 
F. David 
Schoorman, 
Max H. 
Bazerman and 
Robert S. Atkin 
Interlocks as a form of 
uncertainty reduction 
Review of past 
research across 
disciplines and 
approaches 
Varies across 
articles 
reviewed 
Interlocks may lead to reductions in environmental 
uncertainty through horizontal coordination linking 
competitors, vertical coordination linking an 
organization with suppliers or customers, expertise, 
and enhanced reputation 
Economics 
(1969) 
Peter C. Dooley Interlocks among large firms 
as a means of attaining capital 
and possibly violating the 
1914 Clayton Act 
Secondary data from 
1935 and from 
1965; Regression 
analysis 
200 largest 
nonfinancial 
and 50 largest 
financial firms 
in 1935; top 
250 largest 
firms in 1965 
Interlocks tend to be long lasting.  Larger companies 
have more interlocks.  The need for finance is a 
central focus in the appointment of interlocks with 
financial firms 
Management 
(1995) 
Donald O’Neal 
and Howard 
Thomas 
Strategic role of board 
directors; including interlocks 
brought to the position 
Interviews Convenience 
sample of board 
members 
Selection of new board members is guided by the 
interlocks which candidates can provide 
Management  
(2000) 
Kevin Au, Mike 
W. Peng and 
Deins Wang 
Resource dependence as a 
reason behind the existence of 
interlocks among four types of 
firms with critical 
relationships 
Secondary data from 
1996 
200 largest 
firms in pre-
1997 Hong 
Kong 
For differently originating firms, the presence of 
Chinese, British, and American board members varies 
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Discipline Author(s) Orientation/Approach Method of 
Investigation 
Unit of 
Investigation 
Key Findings 
Sociology 
(1981) 
Thomas 
Koening and 
Robert Gogel 
Class hegemony theory is used 
to show the current majority of 
outside directors forms 
linkages that allow power to 
be shared within social 
relationships 
Theoretical 
presentation to 
explain previously 
collected secondary 
data 
Fortune 500 
firms 
Interlocks undermine management control, instead 
creating a shared power system through social 
relationships 
Sociology 
(1979) 
Thomas 
Koenig, Robert 
Gogel, and John 
Sonquist 
Chosen director characteristics 
when replacement occurs due 
to death—are specific patterns 
or linkages maintained? 
Secondary data of 
director 
characteristics; 
Regression Analysis 
Largest 
American firms 
Specific interlocks between firms are not replicated; 
but interlocks among some city-based groups are 
maintained 
Journalism 
(2004) 
Soontae An and 
Hyun Seung Jin 
Inter-firm resource 
dependence as a reason for 
forming financial interlocks 
Secondary data; 
Pooled cross-
sectional time series 
analysis 
13 publicly 
traded 
newspaper 
companies 
A newspaper firm’s financial situation is associated 
with the subsequent appointment of directors with 
financial linkages 
Sociology 
(1998) 
Clifford Kono, 
Donald Palmer, 
Roger Friedland 
and Matthew 
Zafonte 
Interlocks are spatial 
phenomena with spatial 
determinants and causes; thus 
local and non-local interlocks 
have different correlates 
Secondary data; 
Poisson and 
negative binomial 
count regression 
analyses and 
multinomial logistic 
regression analysis 
Largest U.S. 
industrial 
corporations in 
1964 
The location of a firm’s headquarters and upper-class 
clubs vis-à-vis other firms’, location of production 
facilities, and location of the firm’s owners impact 
interlocks 
 
Sociology 
(2007) 
 
Rachel A. 
Schwartz and 
Thomas A. 
Lyson 
 
Direct interlocks between 
large competing companies 
forms a cohesive corporate 
community capable of 
consolidating power among a 
powerful few 
 
Secondary data; 
matrix of interlocks 
created 
 
8 leading food 
retailing 
companies in 
the U.S. 
 
The existence of few direct interlocks between the top 
food firms suggests this sector is still regionally 
dominated 
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Discipline Author(s) Orientation/Approach Method of 
Investigation 
Unit of 
Investigation 
Key Findings 
Sociology 
(1997) 
Gerald F. Davis 
and Henrich R. 
Greve 
Interlocks (both social and 
geographical) as outcomes of 
network structures and 
subsequent board governance 
diffusion 
Secondary data; 
Heterogeneous 
diffusion model 
442 largest 
Fortune 500 
U.S. industrial 
firms in 1980; 
50 largest 
public banks in 
1986; 25 largest 
retail,  and 
transport firms 
in 1986 
The governance practice of poison pills spread rapidly 
through board-to-board diffusion while golden 
parachutes spread slowly through geographic 
proximity. 
Governance and 
Ethics (2003) 
Chin-Huat Ong, 
David Wan and 
Kee-Sing Ong 
Resource Dependency and 
Bank Control Theory 
Secondary data; 
Regression analysis 
295 public 
firms in 
Singapore 
Market capitalization, board size, total assets, return 
on assets, return on sales, profit, and nature of firm 
correlate with board interlocks 
Governance and 
Ethics (2009) 
Jelena Petrovic Impact of culture on 
functioning of interlocks 
Qualitative 
interviews 
13 board 
members in 
Serbia 
The understanding of interlocks impact on board 
functioning developed in Anglo-Saxon nations does 
not explain interlocks elsewhere 
Communication 
(2006) 
Davide 
Carbonai and 
Giovanni Di 
Bartolomeo 
Indirect interlocks as a means 
of competitor collusion and 
function as tacit agreements 
that serve to violate the 
assumptions of competitive 
markets 
Secondary data; 
Graph theory with 
principal component 
analysis 
Italian non-life 
insurance 
industry; 187 
firms in 1994 
Nearly a third of the market is comprised by only 9% 
of firms—the same firms which are members of 
indirect interlocks 
Political 
Science 
(1996) 
Edward J. Zajac 
and James D. 
Westphal 
Interaction and impact of 
board membership and CEO 
power. 
Secondary data; 
Longitudinal 
regression analysis 
Fortune 500 
U.S. firms in 
1986 
CEOs may choose directors based upon their 
interlocks in order to enhance management control of 
firm; within-group ties are more prevalent than 
between-group 
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Discipline Author(s) Orientation/Approach Method of 
Investigation 
Unit of 
Investigation 
Key Findings 
Economics 
(2006) 
Lue Mampaey 
and Claude 
Serfati 
Importance of financial 
interlocks in the consolidation 
and system power of the U.S. 
armament industry 
Secondary data; no 
statistical analysis 
Leading U.S. 
armament 
industry firms 
The evolution of interconnections between the finance 
and armament sectors is leading a self-governing 
system 
Management 
(2001) 
Mike W. Peng, 
Kevin Y. Au 
and Denis Y.L. 
Wang 
Resource dependency theory 
and board characteristics; 
suggest that MNE interlocks 
differ systematically from 
non-MNE interlocks in 
Thailand 
Secondary data; 
regression analysis 
Top 200 public 
firms in 
Thailand 
MNEs in Thailand have more densely connected 
interlocks, are more central in interlock networks, 
appoint more military directors 
Management 
(2001) 
Loizos 
Heracleous and 
John Murray 
Develop inter-organizational 
network typologies based on 
organizational 
interdependence, network 
durability, formalization of 
ties, and networking scope 
Theoretical with 
propositions for 
further investigation 
Review 
previous 
literature 
Suggest that key aspects of East Asia directors’ roles 
differ based on the type of network they are involved 
in based upon the developed typology 
Economics 
(1980) 
Johannes M. 
Pennings 
Investigates interlocks from 
both resource dependency 
with financial firms and 
competitors as well as a means 
of competition reduction 
Secondary data; 
Regression analysis 
800 large public 
U.S. firms 
Interlocks impact organizational effectiveness; the 
competitiveness of and existing interlocks within an 
industry impact future interlocks 
Sociology 
(1983) 
Ronald S. Burt A cooptation approach to 
interlocking directorates 
within large, U.S. firms 
Secondary data; 
Regression analyses 
and structural path 
analyses  
Large public 
U.S. firms 
Interlocking directors create ties to other firms that 
allow for coordination of pricing strategies; defeating 
the forces of market competition through explicit 
inter-firm coordination 
Sociology 
(2004) 
Brian Uzzi and 
Ryon Lancaster 
Embedded relationships 
promote private-information 
flows and informal 
governance 
Interviews and 
secondary data; 
Random effects 
pooled cross-
sectional time series 
regression analysis 
250 large U.S. 
law firms; 
selected 
interviews 
A law firm’s embedded relationships through lawyers 
serving as board members on other organizations’ 
boards influence prices by prompting private-
information flows and informal governance structures 
adding unique value to the good-sand services 
provided.  These ties can both increase and decrease 
prices for complex and basic legal services. 
Economics 
(1984) 
Michael Useem ILDs are a means of creating 
and maintaining an inner 
circle of individuals able to 
communicate, and maintain 
control over (political) 
environmental uncertainties 
Secondary data, 
Regression analysis 
National case 
studies of 
British and U.S. 
firms and 
donations to 
political parties 
Well-connected directors and corporations are able to 
communicate and act upon their corporate political 
interests. 
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Discipline Author(s) Orientation/Approach Method of 
Investigation 
Unit of 
Investigation 
Key Findings 
Sociology 
(1989) 
Davita Silfen 
Glasberg 
Bank hegemony theory Secondary data, 
interviews; 
Regression analysis 
6 case studies 
of large U.S. 
industries, 
firms, and 
banks 
The majority of ILDs are formed with financial 
institutions.  This structural unification through 
directors, together with control over capital flows, 
creates bank hegemony and empowers the banking 
community to impose its perception of economic and 
political reality. 
Sociology 
(1970) 
Robert Fitch 
and Mary 
Oppenheimer 
Bank hegemony theory; 
interlocks as a means of inter-
firm control 
Theoretical with 
antidotal evidence 
Case studies 
across 
industries and 
firms 
Financial institutions may be able to dictate policy, by 
threatening or actually removing executives through 
positions as board members.  It is also suggested that 
industry concentration gives financial institutions new 
leverage over industrial firms. 
Management 
(2003) 
Amy J. Hillman 
and Thomas 
Dalziel 
Integration of resource 
dependency and agency theory 
Theoretical paper 
with propositions 
for relationships and 
moderating 
variables 
Theoretical 
only 
Board capital serves to both monitor managers on 
behalf of shareholders and to provide managers with 
resources such as information; these functions are 
moderated by board incentives. 
Management 
(1990) 
James R. Lang 
& Daniel E. 
Lockhart 
ILDs are indicators of inter-
firm network ties formed due 
to resource dependency 
Secondary data; 
Regression analysis 
longitudinal 
study of the 
airline industry 
Firms experiencing declining profits are more likely 
to appoint a financially-linked board member than 
firms whose profits did not decline. 
Economics 
(1976) 
David Bunting Bank hegemony theory Secondary data, 
Regression analysis 
Sample of 
largest public 
U.S. Firms 
Profitability and ILDs have a curvilinear relationship:  
at first, profitability increases with increasing 
interlocks; however, as interlocks continue to 
increase, profitability begins to decline. 
Political 
Science 
(1987) 
R. Jack 
Richardson 
Resource dependency and 
information flows leading to 
coopition 
Secondary data of 
1963 profits and 
1968 interlocks; 
Regression analyses 
204 large public 
Canadian firms 
Study found little to no effect of past firm ILDs on 
future profitability; but did find a negative impact of 
past profits on future interlocking.  Less profitable 
firms tend to have more financial board members than 
more profitable firms. 
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Discipline Author(s) Orientation/Approach Method of 
Investigation 
Unit of 
Investigation 
Key Findings 
Sociology 
(1985) 
Joseph 
Galaskiewicz, 
Stanley 
Wasserman, 
Barbara 
Rauschenbach, 
Wolfgang 
Bielefeld and 
Patti Mullaney 
ILDs are a strategy of market 
cooptation and are based on 
the associated prestige of 
firms and/or CEOs 
Secondary data from 
many sources 
regarding both firms 
and directors; Logit 
regression analyses 
including matrix 
analyses 
116 
manufacturing 
corporations in 
a metropolitan 
area during 
1978, 1979, 
1980 
Choice and subsequent make-up of metropolitan 
based ILDs are not influenced by the market position 
of firms, dependencies across industrial sectors, or 
labor and consumer markets.  CEOs of the region’s 
largest firms, who were considered “social elites,” 
tended to serve on many local boards and sit on those 
firm’s boards whose CEOs had similar status. 
Sociology 
(1974) 
Michael Patrick 
Allen 
ILDs are cooperative 
strategies to reduce 
environmental uncertainty 
Secondary data; 
Regression analysis 
200 largest 
nonfinancial 
and 50 largest 
financial firms 
between 1935 
and 1970 
The size of a firm is related to the frequency of ILDs 
after controlling for the size of its board.  Financial 
firms are members of more ILDs than nonfinancial 
firms due to their importance for capital resources.  
These interlocks are increasing.  A negative 
relationship is found between resource debt 
dependency and financial interlocks.  Firms with local 
market environments maintain a greater proportion of 
ILDs at the local level than do national firms; 
although local interlocks are dwindling. 
Political 
Science 
(1972) 
Jeffrey Pfeffer Boards aid firms in dealing 
with uncertain environments 
through cooptation 
Secondary data; 
Regression analysis 
80 nonfinancial 
firms, random 
sample 
Board size and composition are shown to be related to 
factors measuring the firm’s need for coopting 
environmental sectors.  The authors propose there is 
an optimum board structure. 
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Figure 1.  Structure of Overlapping Corporate Linear Triples 
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Figure 2.  Corporate Network of Koch Industries, Inc.
Source:  See Table 1.
Figure 3.  Summary Examples from Tables 1 and 2. 
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